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Theoretical work in behavioral economics aims to modify assumptions of 
standard neoclassical models of individual decision-making to better comport with 
observed behavior. The alternative assumptions fall into at least two categories: non-
standard preferences and psychological mistakes. Applications of behavioral economics 
models in law, however, tend to assume that deviations from standard neoclassical 
models are meant to build in psychological mistakes that produce regrettable choices. 
Often follow-on policy prescriptions suggest interventions that either help individuals 
choose correctly or go further to substitute the “correct” choices for those that mistake-
prone individuals might choose in error. Such policy prescriptions are ill suited in cases 
where the applied behavioral economics model assumes non-standard preferences as 
opposed to psychological mistakes. This essay provides examples of models in each 
category and examples of mistaken applications of models that assume non-standard 
preferences rather than psychological mistakes. It also suggests ways to avoid errors 
when applying behavioral economics theories in law. 
 





                                               
1 Nancy Barton Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Boston, MA, 
USA  
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The subfield of behavioral economics has gained substantial traction. Motivated 
in large part by observed behavior that does not comport with predictions derived from 
neoclassical economic models of individual decision-making,2 behavioral economists 
have employed insights from the field of psychology to modify assumptions to sharpen 
the models’ predictive power. Behavioral economics has taken root, so much so that 
publishers now sell textbooks dedicated solely to it (see, e.g., Wilkinson and Klaes 2018; 
Cartwright 2014; Angner 2012), and students are offered semester-long courses on the 
subject.3  
 Modifications of neoclassical model assumptions can be organized into at least 
two categories. The first category is a collection of assumptions that recognizes human 
fallibility grounded in psychological influences.4 While neoclassical models assume that 
humans are able to ignore irrelevant alternatives, accurately weight the likelihood of 
uncertain outcomes, and interpret information in an unbiased fashion, behavior observed 
both in experimental laboratories and in the field supports alternative assumptions that 
humans sometimes err in systematic ways. For example, clearly irrelevant alternatives 
appear to sometimes impact choices (see, e.g., Huber et al. 1982). Some evidence 
suggests we tend to overweight relatively small probability events and underweight 
relatively large probability events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Pidgeon et al. 1992). 
We sometimes underweight the likelihood of negative outcomes (Scheier et al. 1994; 
Weinstein 1980). We tend to attach excessively high probabilities to ex ante uncertain 
                                               
2 I use the terms “neoclassical economics models,” “rational choice theory,” and “standard 
economics models” interchangeably.  
3 The rise of behavioral economics in law is an example of what Guido Calabresi (2016: 2-5) 
refers to as “Law and Economics,” the altering of economic theory to fit the reality of legal 
environments. He contrasts this with “Economic Analysis of Law,” which labels reality as 
irrational if it does not comport with predictions from theories built up from first principles. For 
another view on the distinction between “law and economics” and “economic analysis of law,” 
see Harnay and  Marciano (2009). 
4 I use the term “psychological mistakes” to distinguish mistakes caused by psychological 
influences from those caused by, for example, a lack of perfect information and inability to 
perfectly predict uncertain future events. Standard economic theory sometimes predicts such non-
psychological mistakes or inefficiencies. 
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outcomes if we know the outcome occurred (see, e.g., Walster 1967; Fischhoff 1975). We 
sometimes incorrectly interpret information about uncertain events in ways that serve our 
own interests (see, e.g., Arkin et al. 1980). These psychological tendencies lead to 
choices we might regret if, in fact, judgment errors cause them. 
 The second category of assumption modifications relates to preferences. This set 
of revised theories assumes deviations from a set of standard preferences built into 
neoclassical models of individual choice. For example, under conditions of uncertainty, 
standard expected utility theory assumes that individuals consider the expected value of 
possible outcomes5 and tend to be averse to risk (i.e., we tend to strictly prefer $5 to a 
coin flip that will pay $0 for heads and $10 for tails) (Pratt 1964). The standard model 
also assumes that utility (or happiness) is derived from potential final states of the world 
(i.e., the piles of stuff I might end up with after uncertainty is resolved). Models of 
intertemporal choice assume that individual preferences over waiting are constant over 
time. In other words, we assume that individuals have constant discount rates across time 
(Samuelson 1937).6 Standard models also tend to assume that individuals are wholly self-
interested, which implies that they ignore potential changes in others’ utility.  
 Again, observed behavior often fails to support these assumptions. For example, 
in addition to final states of the world, evidence suggests that one’s happiness sometimes 
depends on outcomes relative to some starting point7 or relative to one’s expectations 
over outcomes (Kőszegi and Rabin 2006). In addition to reflecting risk aversion, some 
observed choices suggest an aversion to perceived expected losses (Kahneman and 
Tyersky 1979). When it comes to patience, some observed behavior suggests discount 
rates are systematically inconsistent over time (Strotz 1955). A substantial collection of 
evidence supports theories assuming “bounded self-interest” or social preferences 
(Preston 1961). As opposed to psychological mistakes, these non-standard preferences, 
conditional on what explains them, lead to choices that do not necessarily generate regret. 
                                               
5 Standard models alternatively assume that individuals assign either objective or subjective 
probabilities to uncertain outcomes (Schoemaker 1982). 
6 For example, if one prefers $110 in one month to $100 today, then $110 in 1 year and 1 month 
is preferred to $100 in one year. 
7 The starting point is often referred to as a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
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In other words, the tendencies might simply reflect preferences that differ from those 
built into standard economics models.  
 Despite the important distinctions between these two categories, scholars who 
import behavioral economics models into legal analyses sometimes mistakenly assume 
that deviations from the standard model reflect psychological mistakes or some level of 
irrationality. Behavioral economics as applied in law has morphed into a theory of 
mistakes (see generally Wright and Stone 2012; Levinson 2012).8 The purpose of this 
essay is to provide examples of mischaracterizations by scholars of deviations from 
standard economics model assumptions, to argue that such mischaracterizations might 
have important implications, and to suggest ways scholars can avoid mischaracterizing 
non-standard preferences as mistakes.9 Unfortunately, the final objective is sometimes 
surprisingly difficult, often due to the ambiguity around the notion of rationality in 
economics and the lack of clarity about the nature of assumptions in work that offers new 
theories to explain observed behavior. I do not aim to resolve the ambiguity here, but 
only to offer pointers scholars might consider when navigating the muddy waters to draw 
normative implications from applications of behavioral economics to law. 
 Part II reviews some of the standard assumptions employed in economics models 
and summarizes a (necessarily oversimplified) version of the concept of rationality. Part 
III briefly describes a handful of examples of behavioral economics assumptions that fall 
into the first category, psychological mistakes. Part IV lists other behavioral economics 
assumptions that imply non-standard preferences as opposed to mistakes. It also provides 
examples of mistaken applications in legal scholarship and argues that such mistakes 
                                               
8 Wright and Stone (2012: 860-861) explain, “Behavioral economics examines ways in which 
economic actors deviate from predicted conduct under rational choice assumptions—in other 
words, how and why actors behave irrationally. Behavioral law and economics attempts to apply 
these insights through policy measures designed to systematically ‘debias’ firms and individuals.” 
Levinson (2012: n.1) similarly states, “Behavioral law and economics is the study of how 
cognitive biases or limitations predictably affect decision-makers' behavior in ways that cause the 
behavior to deviate from what is economically beneficial.” 
9 Thanks to Eyal Zamir for reminding me that scholars might also make the opposite mistake—
mistaking theories grounded in psychological mistakes for theories grounded in non-standard 
preferences. These errors are equally as concerning as those I focus on here. In the same vein, 
economics and psychologists, in addition to legal scholars, sometimes make mistakes when 
characterizing assumptions. 
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have important implications, especially when it comes to normative conclusions.10 Part V 
offers some rules of thumb for avoiding faulty applications. Part VI concludes.  
 
2  The Standard Model and the Concept of Rationality 
 
Joseph Stiglitz (1993: 28), in his best-selling economics textbook, characterizes 
rational choice as being grounded in the assumption that “people weigh the costs and 
benefits of each possibility.” He goes on to explain that this assumption is “based on the 
expectation that individuals…will act in a consistent manner, with a reasonably well-
defined notion of what they like and what their objectives are, and with a reasonable 
understanding of how to attain those objectives” (Stiglitz 1993: 29). The basic steps of 
rational choice, according to Stiglitz (1993: 42-47), are first to identify all possible 
choices, second to define the tradeoffs triggered by each choice, and third to choose after 
correctly calculating opportunity costs and marginal costs, while ignoring sunk costs.11 
Each choice results in an outcome (or expected outcome), and rational choice theory 
assumes one is able to rank the outcomes based on how each impacts one’s utility.12 
                                               
10 It is important to note here that I did not canvas the entire literature to collect sufficient 
evidence to make claims about the prevalence of mistakes about mistakes. Examples were 
relatively easy to find, however. In addition, overly narrow definitions and characterizations of 
the field are quite common (e.g., “Behavioral economics is one of the most significant 
developments in economics over the past thirty-six years. The field combines economics and 
psychology to produce a body of evidence that individual choice behavior departs from that 
predicted by neoclassical economics in a number of decisionmaking situations. These departures 
from rational choice behavior are said to be the result of the individual’s “cognitive biases,” that 
is, systematic failures to act in one’s own interest because of defects in one’s decisionmaking 
process. The documentation of these cognitive biases in laboratory experiments has been 
behavioral economics’ primary contribution to microeconomics. These biases, behavioral 
economists assert, demonstrate systematically irrational choice behavior by individuals and firms. 
This irrational behavior, in turn, breaks the link between revealed preference and individual 
welfare upon which neoclassical economic theory depends.” (Wright and Ginsberg, 2012, p. 
1034); “…B[ehavioral] L[aw and] E[conomics] relies, at its core, on the concept that people 
make predictable errors in judgment.” (Rachlinski, 2011, p. 1682) 
11 Opportunity cost is the lost opportunity from forgoing the next best alternative. Marginal cost is 
the cost incurred when one decides to engage in the next increment of the chosen activity (e.g., 
the cost of increasing the size of one’s army by one additional soldier). Sunk costs are past 
expenditures that cannot be undone. 
12 Standard models are framed in terms of decision utility, as described in the text. Behavioral 
models sometimes employ the notion of experienced utility, which refers to one’s hedonic 
experience associated with an outcome. Inability to predict how different outcomes might impact 
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 Extreme versions of rational choice theory assume that individuals are wholly 
self-interested.13 In other words, we understand how different choices that result in 
various outcomes impact our utility, and we choose the option that produces the utility-
maximizing outcome. Under conditions of uncertainty, where several known states of the 
world are possible, rational choice theory assumes that individuals operate under the 
assumptions of expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Expected 
values are calculated using known probabilities of possible states of the world, expected 
values are translated into expected utilities and the choice resulting in the largest 
expected utility is selected. In line with observed behavior, expected utility models often 
assume some level of risk aversion. When new information is learned, individuals update 
their beliefs about the likelihood of potential outcomes using, say, Bayes’ Rule (Bayes 
and Price 1763). Rational choice theory models generally assume consistent preferences 
over time, while standard discounted utility models assume exponential discounting 
functions (Meyer 1976). 
 More technical conceptualizations of rationality assume that attitudes and 
preferences follow basic principles of logic and probability theory, are coherent, and are 
independent of immaterial or irrelevant factors (Shafir and Le Boeuf 2002). The standard 
model assumes that individuals are able to formulate preference relations, which specify 
how each possible choice compares with all other possible choices (Mas-Colell et al. 
1995: 6).14 Preference relations are often characterized as rational (or well-behaved) if 
they are complete (all choices are compared to every other possible choice), transitive (if 
A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C), and reflexive (each 
choice is equally as good as itself) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 6-7 n.30). Other rational 
preference relation characteristics include cancellation and invariance (Wilkinson and 
                                                                                                                                            
our experienced happiness is the basis for some behavioral economics models (see, e.g. 
Kahneman and Thaler 2006). Behavioral economics has introduced a variety of utilities (e.g., 
anticipatory utility, diagnostic utility, remembered utility, real-time utility, and residual utility) 
(see Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 93-100). These distinctions, while generally important, are 
outside this essay’s scope. 
13 Less extreme versions are flexible about the nature of the preferences driving choices. For one 
view of the assumptions’ history and development, see Jeffrey Harrison  (1985). 
14 If A and B are the only choices, an individual might prefer A to B, or prefer B to A, or be 
indifferent between them.  
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Klaes 2018: 68). A preference relation satisfies cancellation if immaterial or irrelevant 
factors do not change preference orderings (Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 68). Invariance is 
satisfied if different representations of the choice problem yield the same preference 
relation. 
 Behavioral economics characterizes deviations from these assumptions as either 
psychological mistakes or non-standard preferences. The next Part provides examples of 
deviations that belong in the mistake category. Part 4 focuses on deviations related to 
non-standard preferences.  
 
3 Psychological Mistakes 
 
Standard economic theory generally assumes that observed choices reveal a 
chooser’s preferences (Samuelson 1937). This is not to say, though, that standard theories 
do not predict choices that individuals might later regret. Imperfect information, costly 
information, and uncertainty over outcomes, for example, might lead to ex post 
regrettable choices. Neoclassical economics assumes, however, that, under such 
conditions, individual choices maximize ex ante expected utility. This implies that 
interventions beyond the provision of information cannot improve choices.  
 Much of behavioral economics theory aims to infuse standard economic models 
with realistic assumptions that better reflect human fallibility. Starting with a list of 
observed phenomena derived from the field of psychology, behavioral economists update 
standard models to account for mistake-making in an effort to improve the models’ 
predictive power. The mistakes behavioralists focus on often cannot be avoided simply 
by providing information. 
 Psychological mistakes seem to arise from a number of phenomena. Evidence 
suggests psychological hurdles in assessing the likelihood of possible, unknown states of 
the world. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), for example, report evidence of the anchoring-
and-adjustment heuristic, which triggers disproportionate influence of irrelevant 
information initially presented (e.g., one’s social security number) over guesses about 
facts unknown to the guesser, such as the population of New Guinea. In addition, 
Kahneman et al. (1982) summarize abundant evidence suggesting that individuals often 
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overweight low-likelihood events, like winning the lottery. Croson and Sundali (2005) 
summarize evidence of individual susceptibility to the gambler’s fallacy—for example, 
believing tails is “due” after a fair coin flipped a number of times produces a string of 
heads. Seemingly countless other such biases and heuristics have found support in 
reported data (Wilkinson and Klaes 2018: 120-137). 
 In addition, some behavioral economics models predict regrettable choices in 
cases in which individuals experience strong emotions before or during decision-making. 
Lowenstein (2000) observes that “visceral factors often drive people to behave in ways 
that they view as contrary to their own self-interest.” Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2010: 
1056) report evidence suggesting that “[e]ffective emotion regulation seems to be a 
critical success factor in [investment] trading.” Elster (1996: 1391) argues that emotions 
play several different roles in human decision-making, including but not limited to 
“interfere[ing] with belief formation, by inducing self-serving or overly optimistic 
beliefs.” 
 Although behavioral economics has contributed greatly to our understanding of 
psychological mistakes, it is not focused solely on mistake-making. A second class of 
behavioral economics theories, which focuses on non-standard preferences, attempts to 
explain anomalous choices by assuming a set of preferences that deviate from the set 
commonly embedded in rational choice theory models. The key difference is that the 
anomalous choices predicted by this second class of models are not mistakes. Instead 
they merely reflect preferences not accounted for in standard economic models (e.g., 
preferences over inequality of distributions and preferences over loss avoidance).  
 The following Part provides examples from two vast literatures, one attempting to 
explain observed reluctance to trade and another focusing on inconsistent preferences for 
patience over time. 
 
4 Non-Standard Preferences 
 
A number of assumptions related to the nature of preferences are baked into 
rational choice theory models. Observed behavior that does not comport with rational 
choice theory predictions has prompted behavioral economists to posit various features of 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047907
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preferences that diverge from standard assumptions. Despite the divergence, the theories 
assume that such preferences are rational in the sense that they do not lead to regrettable 
mistakes. This part summarizes two sets of behavioral economics theories that assume 
non-standard, rational preferences.15 
 
4.1 Reluctance to Trade Endowed Items 
 
One of the most well known anomalies economists study is the observed 
difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept.16 Standard economic 
models generally assume that valuations of items are independent of one’s endowment 
(or ownership) status. In contrast to this assumption, in both laboratory and field 
experiments, researchers have observed valuation gaps—reported valuations for an 
endowed item that exceed those for the same item when it is not endowed. In some 
experiments subjects are asked whether they want to trade an endowed item for an 
alternative item of similar market value. In these experimental environments, we 
commonly observe exchange asymmetries—subjects seem reluctant to give up their 
endowed items in exchange for the alternative.17  
                                               
15 Others exist. The discussion here is meant only to provide examples. Furthermore, it’s 
important to reiterate that the theoretical and empirical literatures related to each of the examples 
provided in this Part are vast. Each contains multiple theories, some assuming non-standard 
preferences and some assuming psychological mistakes. Some theories have found more support 
in the data than others, but each literature contains multiple theories that are able to explain 
substantial portions of existing data. Those who import behavioral economics theories into legal 
scholarship sometimes mistake theories of non-standard preferences for theories of mistakes, and 
they also fail to acknowledge theories other than the one (or few) they apply and draw normative 
claims from. Both oversights lead to confusion in legal scholarship. 
16 Willingness to pay is measured by the most amount of money one is willing to exchange to 
obtain some item. Willingness to accept is measured by the least amount of money one is willing 
to accept in exchange for giving up an endowed item. 
17 This general phenomenon is commonly known as the “endowment effect.” This term causes 
confusion, however, because it connotes a particular explanation, that the endowment somehow 
causes the observed effect. While some theories focus on the endowed nature of the good, several 
competing theories that focus on other features of the contexts are able to explain large swaths of 
observed choices. Thus, neutral labels such as “valuation gap” and “exchange asymmetry” are 
less likely to confuse the reader or compel placing excessive weight on one theory over others. 
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 Economists have posited several theories to explain observed reluctance to trade 
one’s endowment for some other item or for money.18 Endowment theory, recently 
replaced by theories with better predictive power, was a leading contender for over a 
decade. This theory is an application of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory 
to contexts of riskless choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). The model deviates from 
the assumptions of rational choice theory in three ways.19 First, the model assumes that 
preferences are reference point dependent: choices depend on where one begins, “usually 
correspond[ing] to [one’s] current position, …[but one’s reference point] can also be 
influenced by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons” (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991: 1046-1047).20 This differs from the rational choice theory assumption 
that individuals consider only the impact final outcomes have on utility. Second, the 
model assumes that individuals are averse to losses in the sense that “losses loom larger 
than corresponding gains” (Tversky and Kahneman 1991: 1039). Third, the authors posit 
that sensitivity to marginal gains and marginal losses diminishes with distance from one’s 
starting point.  
 Despite these deviations from rational choice theory, the theory’s authors do not 
assume that preferences of the type they posit are irrational per se (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991: 1057-1058). They argue that the normative status of the assumptions 
must be judged by “a prediction of the quality of the experience of [a] consequence” in 
the relevant decision context. Tversky and Kahneman further argue that “a bias in favor 
of the status quo can be justified if the disadvantages of any change will be experienced 
more keenly than its advantages.” (p. 1057; emphasis added) They then provide examples 
of circumstances that might not trigger reluctance to trade: 
                                               
18 For a comprehensive review of the literature, see Zeiler (2018). In addition to summarizing the 
numerous theories that might explain observed reluctance to trade, the review critiques 
techniques used by empiricist to elicit choices. Such controversies exist in most if not all 
economics literatures. Unfortunately, scholars who import theories from economics and 
psychology into legal analyses often gloss over such inherent messiness. 
19 The authors employ an additional set of technical assumptions that are irrelevant for our 
purposes. 
20 Much evidence suggests that one’s endowment does not impact valuation and thus does not 
support endowment theory. A substantial portion of existing data, however, supports alternative 
theories (e.g., Kőszegi and Rabin 2006) that assume that reference points are set by expectations 
and not endowments (see Zeiler 2018).  
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“[S]ome reference levels that are naturally adopted in the context of 
decision are irrelevant to the subsequent experience of outcomes, and the 
impact of such reference levels on decision is normatively dubious. In 
evaluating a decision that has long-term consequences, for example, the 
initial response to these consequences may be relatively unimportant, if 
adaptation eventually induces a shift of reference. Another case involves 
principal-agent relations: the principal may not wish the agent’s decision 
to reflect the agent’s aversion to losses, because the agent’s reference level 
has no bearing on the principal’s experience of outcomes.” (p. 1057-58) 
 
 Despite these important and explicit nuances, a number of scholars have argued 
that observed reluctance to trade violates rationality. Jolls et al. (1998: 1545) point to 
prospect theory as an example of “bounded rationality” despite the fact that the theory’s 
authors have explicitly claimed that at least some of the theory’s posited deviations from 
standard theory are not per se irrational (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Fried (2013: 
1255) infers that behavioral economics scholars have concluded that reluctance to trade is 
irrational because such reluctance suggests that valuation depends on something other 
than the actual utility of the endowed item.21 Similarly, Levinson (2012: 593-594), in an 
article titled “Superbias,” describes observed reluctance to trade as “irrational” behavior. 
He also claims that valuations of owned goods are excessively high and reluctance to 
trade is “considered economically irrational because the inflation of perceived worth 
inhibits the transfer of goods at what might otherwise be a desirable price.” (p. 607) 
Levinson cites to several experimental studies and literature reviews, but not to the 
primary source of endowment theory, Tversky and Kahneman’s 1991 article, which 
makes clear that aversion to loss is not per se irrational. Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010: 
42-43) discuss results from an experiment designed to study the impact of ownership of 
intellectual property on valuation, claiming that an owner “might demand, in part due to 
                                               
21 None of the works Fried cites to support the claim of irrationality actually claim that reluctance 
to trade is irrational. In fact, two cited articles (Korobkin 2003: 1280; Korobkin 1998: 666-667) 
claim that the endowment effect is not per se irrational. Fried (2013: 1260) also refers to loss 
aversion and reference dependence as “cognitive biases.”  
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an endowment effect, an irrational amount of money to license her song to another user 
who wants to use part of the song as a sample in a new work.”  
 Some descriptions are more nuanced. For example, Jones and Brosnan (2008), in 
an important article explaining the usefulness of bringing cognitive science to bear on 
behavioral economics theories, describe experiments related to reluctance to trade. They 
claim that the “propensity to value an item not solely on the characteristics of the item 
itself, but also according to abstract notions of ownership, suggests that people are often 
pricing goods and rights irrationally.” Jones and Brosnan (2008: f.12) recognize that 
some have questioned whether reluctance to trade signals irrational preferences22 but 
conclude that “[r]egardless of terminology, the key point is that the change in preference 
seems irrational, and if it is so, then even ‘rational’ pursuit of an irrational preference can 
make problems for law.” Jones and Brosnan (2008: 1951) also refer to loss aversion as a 
“seemingly irrational predisposition.” 
 Assuming that reluctance to trade is irrational when the cited theory is not 
grounded in such an assumption has important implications when it comes to forwarding 
normative legal claims. Generally, if reference dependence and loss aversion are rational 
characteristics of individual preferences, then, from a normative standpoint, regulators 
should lean towards avoiding interfering with individuals’ expression of them.23 A useful 
analogy is our regulatory response to risk aversion. We have long understood that 
individuals tend to be willing to pay more than the expected loss to shift risk of a 
potential loss to another party, at least in some domains. The regulatory response has not 
been to work to “debias” individuals or to somehow work around aversion to risk. 
Instead, regulators expend resources to ensure that insurance markets are robust so that 
                                               
22 “There have been some interesting semantic discussions of whether or not, even if it exists, the 
endowment effect is formally irrational. One can argue, for example, that once a person's 
preference for the item has increased, then acting consistent with that preference is rational. 
Similarly, one could argue (perhaps tautologically) that seemingly irrational behavior simply 
reflects rational, utility-maximizing behavior among people who share an unexpectedly odd 
utility function. Alternatively, one could simply say that observed disparities challenge expected 
utility theory as a good model for decision making under uncertainty.”  
23 Alternatively, preferences that compel acts that infringe on others’ rights (e.g., A prefers to 
steal B’s possessions) should be regulated in ways that protect recognized rights. The main point 
here is that regulatory tactics will differ depending on how we interpret the problems that give 
rise to the need for intervention. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047907
 15 
individuals can efficiently transfer risk to insurance companies. We do not try to 
convince consumers that they should not be willing to pay more than the expected loss 
for insurance, but we do work to bolster competitive insurance markets so that consumers 
can enjoy maximum surplus from trades given preferences characterized by risk aversion. 
In the same way, regulators should acknowledge the possibility that at least some are loss 
averse and consider regulatory approaches that allow individuals to efficiently express 
these non-standard preferences.   
 While some researchers are appropriately cautious about the leap to the normative 
(see, e.g., Jones and Brosnan 2008: 1988), others assume that the law is well positioned 
to remedy irrationality signaled by observed choices that deviate from rational choice 
theory predictions. Fried (2013: 1266, fn. 52), for example, claims that “if…refusal to 
make obviously superior trades results from the endowment effect…, then…sensible 
policy interventions would look to debiasing consumers' irrational attachment to what 
they happen to have…” 24  Korobkin (2003) suggests that the government, when 
compensating owners for takings, can avoid the inefficiencies caused by endowment 
effect by paying fair market value rather than the owner’s valuation (Korobkin 2003).25 
Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010: 43-44) suggest that intellectual property policy should 
be designed to address reluctance to trade in an effort to avoid “market failure.” 
                                               
24 In support of this normative claim, Fried cites to Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup (2015). 
Arlen and Tontrup, in their normative discussion, however, assume that reluctance to trade is 
caused by a preference to avoid feelings of regret and not by loss aversion. Although Arlen and 
Tontrup (2015: 175-178) do not have loss aversion in mind, they seem to mistakenly characterize 
regret avoidance as a mistake, describing regret avoidance as a bias in need of a remedy. They 
(2015: 153) describe actions in the absence of regret aversion as “rational.” They do this despite 
the fact that the authors of regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982: 822), which Arlen and 
Tontrup cite early on, explicitly characterize the model of regret avoidance as a model of rational 
choice.  
25 Korobkin (2003: 1265) explains “If the government wishes to promote the efficient use of 
resources by redistributing rights if and only if the valuation of those rights by the winners 
exceeds the valuation of the losers, but WTA is considered an illegitimate measure of value, then 
permitting the community to condemn landowners' rights and requiring it to pay a fixed price 
determined by the state might be an appropriate policy.” Korobkin (2003: 1280), however, does 
recognize the possibility that reluctance to trade might not be irrational, stating that “the 
endowment effect is not obviously ‘irrational’ behavior: a preference for what one has over what 
one does not have…is no more troublesome than a preference for chocolate ice cream over 
vanilla.” 
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 Regardless of whether we should consider reluctance to trade as a signal of 
irrational preferences, it is important to at least acknowledge the nuances spelled out by 
the theories’ authors. The same goes for other observations studied by behavioral 
economists. The next subsection summarizes similar problems with the importation of 
theories related to preferences over delay across time. 
 
4.2 Inconsistent Time Preferences 
 
Another much discussed behavioral departure from rational choice theory is 
observed inconsistency in preferences related to delays that occur at different points in 
time (e.g., delays in the near future versus delays in the distant future).26 Rational choice 
theory models generally assume an exponential discounting function, which implies that 
future consumption impacts current utility less than present consumption. More 
specifically, the current value we get for consumption decreases as the delay to 
consumption increases. The standard model also assumes consistent levels of patience for 
delay over time. For example, if one prefers $100 today over $110 a week from now, the 
theory predicts that the individual will prefer $100 in a month over $110 a month and one 
week from now.  
 The empirical literature is replete with documented evidence of observed behavior 
that deviates from the standard model’s predictions. One in a long list of anomalies is 
sometimes referred to as present bias. Evidence suggests that individual levels of patience 
for delay over time are inconsistent.27 In particular, individuals seem more sensitive to 
delays closer in time to the present as opposed to delays further out into the future (Cohen 
et al. 2016).28  While researchers have observed several other anomalies relative to the 
                                               
26 See Mas-Colell et al. (1995: 733-736) for a general description of the standard discounting 
model.  
27 As with most observations studied in economics, disagreement exists over interpretation and 
causal mechanisms. Stahl (2013) lists studies that have posed challenges to the validity of 
experiments reporting evidence of present bias and offering a rational choice theory explanation 
for observed inconsistent time preference. 
28 This excellent review catalogs difficulties with measuring individual time preferences. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3047907
 17 
standard discounted utility model,29 legal scholars seem especially interested in present 
bias. 
 In light of such observed behavior, behavioral economics theorists have offered 
alternatives to the standard discounting model with the goal of increasing the theory’s 
predictive power. Interestingly, the theoretical literature got its start with models of 
animal behavior (see, e.g., Chung and Herrnstein 1967). Using similar concepts, Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981) developed a theory of self-control to explain the use of commitment 
devices (e.g., Christmas club savings accounts). Thaler and Shefrin (1981: 393, 404) 
explicitly assume that the use of such devices is rational, and they characterize their 
theory as a theory of rational behavior.30 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992: 574-578) 
followed with one of the first non-standard economics models that assumes inconsistent 
time preferences, modeled using a hyperbolic discounting function, and the ability to 
employ commitment devices. The authors do not directly discuss whether the features of 
preferences assumed by the model are rational, but they do characterize the deviations 
from standard theory in preference terms as opposed to mistakes.31 Building on Thaler 
and Shefrin’s theory of self-control, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) lay out a dual-self 
                                               
29 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) provide one of the earliest lists of anomalies.  
30  The model assumes two selves: a myopic doer, who derives utility only from current 
consumption, and a planner, who is concerned with lifetime utility. The planner rationally 
chooses to impose constraints on the doer when the costs of doing so are relatively low. 
31 For example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992: 595) state, “Our model by no means incorporates 
all important psychological factors that influence intertemporal choice. For example, like any 
model with nonconstant discounting, it yields time-inconsistent behavior or ‘myopia’…. 
However, it cannot explain the high levels of conflict that such myopic behavior often evokes. 
Intertemporal choice often seems to involve an internal struggle for self-command….At the very 
moment of succumbing to the impulse to consume, individuals often recognize at a cognitive 
level that they are making a decision that is contrary to their long-term self-interest. Mathematical 
models of choice do not shed much light on such patterns of cognition and behavior.” They 
(1992: 592) do, however, recognize potential conditions for suboptimal choice: “Relative to 
normative theory, our model suggests that people may tend to prefer plans that sacrifice the 
medium-range future for the sake of the short and the long term. There is nothing clearly wrong 
with this, provided that one can commit to an entire plan at the moment of decision. However, if 
the optimal plan can be recalculated at later points in time, then the planned sacrifice in midrange 
consumption will not take effect…. As a result, a bias in favor of the long and short runs may in 
practice yield behavior that is oriented only to the short run.” Furthermore, Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992: 581) observe, “The shape and reference point assumption reflects basic 
psychophysical considerations: extra attention to negative aspects of the environment, decreasing 
sensitivity to increments in stimuli of increasing magnitude, and cognitive limitations” (emphasis 
added). 
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model of impulse control. They (2006: 1451) explicitly characterize the preference 
assumptions as rational. According to these models, choices that seem irrational might in 
fact be rational, reflecting high costs of delayed gratification. Importantly, assuming a 
hyperbolic discounting function does not necessarily imply irrational preferences. 
 Others have modeled inconsistent time discounting as leading to choices that 
individuals might regret. This family of models makes various assumptions about the 
level of individual awareness about the potential for mistakes. For example, O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (2001) posit that individuals are partially naïve. Specially, individuals 
understand their future self-control problems, but they underestimate the problems’ 
magnitude. Some point to these models to explain the “underutilization” of available 
commitment devices (e.g., investing one’s savings in illiquid assets). Alternatively, 
Laibson (1997) constructs a model to explain behavior in contexts where individuals 
cannot access a perfect commitment device. Laibson (1997) argues that preferences 
characterized by hyperbolic discounting lead individuals to suboptimal decisions.32  
 These two models illustrate the diversity in the literature—some models suggest 
non-standard preferences and make no claims about mistakes, while others assume that 
individuals adopt techniques to avoid mistakes, and still others claim that behavior that 
does not comport the predictions of standard theory reflects errors in judgment. Despite 
the perspective of many who apply these various theories to law, reviewers (Frederick et 
al. 2002) of the discounting literature have explicitly noted that “it is unclear whether any 
of the [discounted utility model] ‘anomalies’ should be regarded as mistakes.” Further 
complicating the picture, researchers have generated a large literature critiquing the 
methods used to measure time preferences (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 2016).  
 Despite the diversity of model types in the economics literature, scholars who 
apply behavioral economics to law often claim that inconsistent time preferences are 
irrational. Wright and Stone (2012: 1530), for example, refer generally to hyperbolic 
discounting as a “willpower error.” Similarly, in an article published by a law review, 
Rizzo and Whitman (2009), both economists, characterize inconsistent time preferences 
                                               
32 For example, if I cannot use a commitment device to start saving for the future, I might plan to 
start saving in a year, but when the time comes I chose to consume and not save and make 
another plan to start saving in the future. And, so on. I never save, which puts my future self in a 
bind. 
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as evidence of irrationality despite the diverse characterizations in the economics 
literature.33 Gandhi (2008: 140) likewise labels hyperbolic discounters as irrational. 
Bowers (2008: 815) describes hyperbolic discounting as “the product of the inability to 
think and to act rationally in the face of pain.” Viscusi (2007: 239) describes 
experimental findings of hyperbolic discounting as documenting “intertemporal 
irrationality.” Yahya (2006: 73) claims that “psychologists and economists have long 
held the idea that people irrationally prefer small present gains to larger future gains.” 
Hanson and Yosifon (2004: 43-44) describe hyperbolic discounting as a “choice bias,” 
which they define as a “mental contamination” that we wish to avoid but that is difficult 
to eliminate. Farber (2003: 328) describes inconsistent time preferences as seemingly 
irrational. Ainslie and Monterosso (2003: 831) claim that “most people would call 
irrational” preferences characterized by a hyperbolic discounting function.34 
 Characterizing inconsistent time preferences as irrational leads some researchers 
to jump too easily to regulatory methods designed to correct mistakes or to ignore 
preferences in policy making. If models that assume rationality are accurate explanations 
of observed choices, then policies might be best geared toward reducing the costs of 
commitment devices and lowering the costs of delayed gratification. This might require 
getting a good handle on factors that increase such costs to be able to best fashion 
policies to reduce them. Regulators might also consider methods to increase individual 
awareness of the best available commitment devices. 
 If, on the other hand, we mistakenly assume inconsistent time preferences are 
mistakes, policy prescriptions might tilt unnecessarily in the direction of costly 
information dissemination aimed at increasing awareness of inconsistent time preferences 
or, perhaps worse, limiting choices perceived by regulators to satisfy irrational desires for 
                                               
33  While Rizzo and Whitman (2009: 913-914) state, “People who engage in hyperbolic 
discounting may exhibit time inconsistency: they will make decisions about future trade-offs and 
then reverse those decisions later…. Behavioral economists take this sort of inconsistency as 
evidence of irrationality,” the authors do not cite to any authority for this claim. They point the 
reader, however, to Frederick et al. (2002) to support their definition of hyperbolic discounting. 
Recall that these authors express doubts over whether inconsistent time preferences should be 
considered mistakes.   
34 They state, “This curve gives preference a property that most people would call irrational—an 
innate tendency to switch from better-later goods to poorer-earlier goods simply as the earlier 
goods become imminently available.” (p. 831) 
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instant gratification. The literature contains various sorts of potentially misguided 
normative claims grounded in the characterization of inconsistent time preferences as 
irrational. Gandhi (2008: 142), for example, argues that government can aid irrational 
students plagued by inconsistent time preferences by providing upfront tuition subsidies. 
Ainslie and Monterosso (2003) recognize potential benefits of using law to correct 
mistakes made by hyperbolic discounters but list reasons why achieving this goal might 
be impossible. Perhaps most troubling, Viscusi (2007: 239-240) assumes that present bias 
is irrational and argues that environmental policy makers should ignore their constituents’ 
preferences.35 These sorts of normative claims fail to recognize the lack of consensus in 
the literature related to whether present bias leads to regrettable mistakes (Frederick et al. 
2002). 
 Importantly, characterizing a behavioral model’s assumptions as either grounded 
in mistakes or in non-standard preferences does not necessarily lead us to particular 
policy prescriptions. Mitchell (2005) lays out a number of reasons why policies designed 
to correct mistakes are not necessarily normatively appealing. Similarly, the absence of 
potential mistakes does not automatically trigger a hands-off approach. If our aim is to 
maximize total social welfare, we sometimes do best by allowing individuals to make 
choices in line with their preferences. In others cases, we can justify regulation in the 
absence of mistakes if, for example, markets are hampered by imperfections such as 
externalities and imperfect information. Furthermore, we might collectively decide that 
some preferences are socially unacceptable and that choices driven by them should be 
punished. The main point is that optimal regulation depends heavily on the factors that 
drive choices; if we are wrong about what drives behavior, regulation might do more 
harm than good.  
 This Part provided examples of mistakes about mistakes from two behavioral 
economics literatures that are commonly imported into legal scholarship. Although these 
                                               
35 Specifically, Viscusi (2007: 239-240, fn. 85) states, “Given that people's revealed intertemporal 
preferences display hyperbolic discounting, should policy prescriptions for discounting practices 
reflect these preferences? My view is that this form of intertemporal irrationality should not be 
incorporated into official discounting practices, which instead should be based on the opportunity 
cost of capital rather than the irrational, myopic concerns embodied in hyperbolic discounting.” 
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sorts of mistaken applications appear quite frequently, they are avoidable. The next Part 
offers steps scholars can take to avoid such mistakes.  
 
5 Avoiding Mistaken Applications 
 
To reduce the risk of mistakenly claiming that assumed preferences are irrational 
or that an applied theory assumes individual choices reflect psychological mistakes, 
scholars should always carefully consult the primary source of the applied theory, resist 
resolving ambiguity by assuming that the applied theory assumes mistake-making, and 
gain an understanding of the full scope of the relevant economics literature. Given the 
field’s young age, behavioral economics literatures generally posit a number of possible 
theories for the same observed behavior, only some of which assume psychological 
mistakes as opposed to non-standard preferences or other sorts of behavioral drivers. 
 Consult and cite to primary sources. To avoid confusion, best practice requires 
directly consulting and citing to the primary source, keeping in mind the distinction 
between non-standard preferences and mistakes, and other sorts of theoretical drivers of 
behavior. Unfortunately, misinterpretation is quite common; thus, avoid relying on 
others’ descriptions and interpretations. If a theory author is not explicit about the nature 
of the theory’s assumptions, determine whether the author makes any implicit 
assumptions along these lines. In addition, avoid “applying” observed behavior. Instead, 
apply theories about what drives observed behavior.36 
 Resist generalizing behavioral economics as a theory of errors. In the face of 
uncertainty about the nature of theoretical assumptions, avoid concluding that assumed 
features of preferences, beliefs, and choices signal irrationality.  That a theory’s 
assumptions differ in some way from those built into standard economic theories does not 
necessarily imply irrationality. At a minimum, defend claims of irrationality or mistaken 
choices. Explain why we might assume that individuals acting under the applied model’s 
assumptions might regret their choices.  
 Apply literatures, not single theories. Given the field’s young age, very few, if 
any, research questions have definitive answers. All behavioral economics literatures 
                                               
36 For more on this, see Zeiler (2010).  
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contain multiple theories designed to explain what drives a single observed behavior. 
Some assume non-standard but rational preferences.  Some predict that individuals will 
commit psychological errors. Some suggest other sorts of behavioral drivers. Unless a 
literature has reached a consensus around what explains the relevant observed behavior, it 
is important to describe variations in theories that find support in reported data. In some 
cases, this is best accomplished by pointing the reader to a recent literature review, after, 
of course, verifying that the review accurately describes each theory. Reviewers 
sometimes get it wrong. 
 Additional difficulty is introduced by the fact that definitions of “rational 
preference” and “rationality” offered in the literature lack consistency. No hard and fast 
rules exist for identifying irrationality. Importers of behavioral economic theories might 
rely on the theorists’ characterizations of posited preference features as rational or 
irrational, but these claims are, of course, not binding on importers, at least in the sense 
that importers are free to disagree with the author’s characterizations. Thus, perhaps at a 
minimum, importers should make it a practice to disclose all relevant theories along with 
the theorists’ characterizations of preferences as rational or irrational, and argue for or 
against those characterizations.  Given that many literatures contain collections of 
theories that, taken together, recognize the possibility of both mistakes and non-standard 
preferences, appliers should strive to accurately summarize the state of the literature. 
Once the reader has a basic understanding of the flavors of different theories, importers 
are free to offer normative claims based on hypotheticals that assume that one or more of 




The field of behavioral economics, while relatively new, has come a long way in 
its efforts to improve the predictive power of economic theory. Improvements are 
achieved, in some cases, by modifying assumptions of the standard model. Although 
these modifications take a variety of forms, behavioral economics mistakenly has come 
to be known as the theory of irrationality. This mischaracterization misses the fact that 
many behavioral theories assume perfect rationality. For at least some of these rational 
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behavioral models, assumption modifications focus on the introduction of non-standard 
preferences, such as loss aversion, hyperbolic discounting, and other-regarding 
preferences.  
What might explain overgeneralizations of behavioral economics as a set of 
theories rooted in mistake making? Although this difficult question is not taken up in this 
Essay, a couple conjectures might act as useful starting points. First, the earliest importers 
of behavioral economics into law did not always recognize the theories’ nuances. For 
example, although Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998) distinguished between mistakes 
(e.g., bounded rationality) and non-standard preferences (e.g., bounded self-interest), they 
imprecisely characterized the endowment effect at an example of bounded rationality 
even though Tversky and Kahneman (1991) were agnostic. Unfortunately, scholars often 
cite to imprecise characterizations of original work rather than to the original work itself 
(Klass and Zeiler 2013). Second, as Klass and Zeiler (2013, pp. 55-59) suggest, 
behavioral economics theories were “the right theor[ies] at the right time.”37 For many 
years, legal scholars resisted general claims that neoclassical economics models predicted 
optimal outcomes in the absence of heavy-handed regulation. Theories of mistakes 
arising from behavioral economics reinvigorated the need for regulation. Law was once 
again a vital component in the quest for optimal outcomes. This outlook might have 
compelled the generalizations and imprecision that arose as behavioral economics was 
voraciously imported into legal analyses. Again though, much work is required to test 
these ad hoc conjectures. 
 Mistakes about psychological mistakes have important implications when it 
comes to normative claims importers draw from descriptive theories. When those who 
generate policy prescriptions fail to recognize that deviations from behavioral predictions 
of standard theory might be due to non-standard, rational preferences as opposed to 
mistakes, they risk proposing “fixes” that do more harm than good. Interventions 
designed to help individuals correct mistakes might waste limited government resources, 
lead to confusion and steer individuals away from their preferred choices. Careful 
application of behavioral economics theories requires consulting and citing to primary 
                                               
37 Klass and Zeiler (2013) focus on endowment theory, but the same argument can be generalized 
to behavioral economics theory. 
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sources, resisting generalizing behavioral theories as theories of mistakes and applying 
literatures rather than individual theories. By distinguishing between psychological 
mistakes and non-standard preferences, importers can make more effective use of 
behavioral economics insights.  
 Calabresi (2016: 16) reminds us that “the world as it is often …represents worthy 
relationships and behaviors that the theory…does not explain. And it is essential…that 
such data from the world as it is be used to reform the theory…because what the 
empiricist describes is often not irrational but highly worthy and should not only be 
retained by also explained.” Calabresi focuses here on rational choice theorists’ mistakes 
relating to labeling behavior that does not comport with rational choice theory predictions 
as irrational and then offering prescriptions for better aligning behavior with such 
predictions. Calabresi’s advice, however, applies equally well to those who import 
behavioral economics into legal scholarship and policy. Valid normative claims require a 
clear understanding of the factors that drive choices.  
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